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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
INTERMOUNTAIN
AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and THAD B. EMERY, License
Assessor of Salt Lake City,
Defendants and Respondents;
and
GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.

*

*

*

GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC.,
Cross-claimant and Appellant,
vs.

BOARD OF COMl\HSSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
Cross-defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
1

Case No.
ll934

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The original action is a suit to enjoin the defendantappellant, Gold Cross Services, Inc., from operating
ambulances in or upon the streets of Salt Lake City.
The Counterclaim and Cross-claim of defendant-appellant attacked the validity of the Salt Lake City ordinance which requires a certificate of convenience and
necessity from the City to operate ambulances, and
asked for damages against the plaintiff by reason of the
issuance of the temporary restraining order and the
preliminary injunction.

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The Court dismissed the Counterclaim and Crosscomplaint of defendant-appellant and likewi.se dissolved
the injunctions theretofore issued upon the assertion
that the issues relating thereto were now moot.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant, Gold Cross Services, Inc.,
seeks to have the Order of the Court dismissing its
Cross-complaint and Counterclaim reversed; for a determination that the said City ordinance, insofar as it requires a certificate of convenience and necessity, is invalid; and, that the case be remanded to the District
Court for the purpose of ascertaining the damages
which defendant-appellant has sustained by reason of
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the issuance and maintenance in force of the restraining
order and injunction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
By application dated July 10, 1968, Gold Cross
Services, Inc., applied to the Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake City Corporation for licenses and for a
certificate of convenience and necessity to operate ambulances for hire in and upon the streets of Salt Lake
City, as required by the Salt Lake City ordinance relating thereto. The application was approved on July
31, 1968 and certificates of convenience and necessity
were issued by Salt Lake City Corporation to Gold
Cross Services, Inc.
Plaintiff then asked for an injunction against the
City and Gold Cross Services, Inc., to prevent the operation of said ambulances under such licenses and certificates on the ground that no public hearing, after
notice, had been held as required by the Salt Lake City
ordinances relating thereto, to-wit, Title 44, Chapter 2,
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City ( R. 1) . A copy
of the ordinance was attached to the Complaint (R. 5-9)
except for an amendment of June 18, 1968, which is
set forth at R. 99. A temporary restraining order was
issued ( R. 10-12) and thereafter a preliminary injunction followed ( R. 19-20), which restrained defendantappellant from operating its ambulances on or upon
the streets of Salt Lake City pending a formal hearing
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and issuance thereafter of certificates of convenience
and necessity by the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City Corporation.
Defendant-appellant, Gold Cross Services, Inc.,
after an original answer, filed its
answer and
counterclaim to plaintiff's complaint asking for damages
against the plaintiff by reason of the injunctions (R. 2931) and in the same pleading a crossclaim against the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City Corporation
in the nature of a complaint for a declaratory judgment
alleging and asserting that Salt Lake City Corporation
was without jurisdiction or authority to deny defendant
the right to operate its ambulances in or upon the streets
of Salt Lake City, because the ordinance under which
it purported to require certificates of convenience and
necessity is invalid as being beyond the jurisdiction,
power and authority of the City to enact, for various
reasons therein alleged ( R. 32-35) and as specifically
hereinafter set forth and discussed in the arguments in
this brief.
Thereafter, defendant-appellant, Gold Cross Services, Inc., filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
predicated essentially upon the invalidity of the ordinance ( R. 36) . The matter was argued and considered
and the Motion denied on January 30, 1969 by Judge
Stewart M. Hanson (R. 46-47).
Thereafter, numerous proceedings were had which
have no relevance to the matters herein before the Court.
Defendant-appellant filed a Motion for immediate spe4

cial trial setting in order to bring the matter before the
Court. The matter was set for hearing, at which time
the parties to the action stipulated that there had been
no substantial changes in the circumstances as they
might relate to the validity or invalidity of the ordinance
since the time of the ruling of Judge Stewart M. Hanson thereon (R. 96-99). Judge Merrill C. Faux, after
having the matter submitted and having taken the same
under advisement then entered his Judgment dated
N oyember 11, 1969 (R. 100-102) dismissing defendantappellant's Counterclaim and Crossclaim and adopting
the opinion of Judge Hanson with regard to the validity
of the ordinance.
The plaintiff, Intermountain Ambulance Service,
Inc., is the successor in interest to companies which had
obtained certificates under the Grandfather Clause of
said city ordinance (Section 44-2-8) and is the only
company operating under a certificate of convenience
and necessity from Salt Lake City. Defendant-appellant, Gold Cross Services, Inc., operates ambulances
under licenses from Salt Lake County, Utah.

The Ordinance: The ordinance, the validity of
which defendant-appellant, Gold Cross Services, Inc.,
questions, is Section 44, Chapter 2, Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, the pertinent parts of which read as
follows:
Sec. 44-2-1. Certificate required. No person
shall operate, or permit to be operated, an ambulance owned or controlled by him as a vehicle
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for hire upon the streets of Salt Lake City without
first obtained a certificate of public
convemence and necessity from the board of commissioners.
Sec. 44-2-2. Application for certificate. An
application for a certificate shall be filed with the
license assessor and collector upon forms provided by Salt Lake City, and said application
shall be verified under oath and shall furnish the
following information:
( 1) The name and address of the applicant
and in the event the application is made by a corporation, a certified copy of the articles of incorporation. No application shall be made on
behalf of another person without disclosing that
fact.
( 2) The number of vehicles actually owned

and the number of vehicles actually operated by
such applicant on the date of such application.

( 3) The number of vehicles for which a
certificate of public convenience and necessity is
desired and the location and proposed depots and
terminals.

( 4) The financial status of the applicant,
including any unpaid or unbonded judgments of
record against such applicant, the title of all ac·
tions and the amount of all such judgments and
the nature of the transaction or acts giving rise
to said judgments.
( 5) The experience of applicant in the

transportation of sick or injured persons, and
its training program in first aid and medical care.
( 6) Any facts which the applicant believes
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tend to prove that public convenience and necessity require the granting of a certificate.
( 7) The insignia, color scheme and name
to be used to designate the vehicle or vehicles
of the applicant.
( 8) Such other information as the board of

reqmre.

may, in its discretion, reasonably

Sec. 44-2-3. Public hearing. Upon the filing of an application, the board of commissioners
shall fix a time and place for a public hearing.
Sec. 44-2-4. Notice to applicant and public.
Notice of the public hearing provided in the preceding section shall be given to the applicant by
United States mail and notice shall be given the
general public of Salt Lake City by posting a
notice of such hearing in the office of the city
recorder.
Sec. 44-2-5. Notice to holders of certificates.
Notice of the public hearing provided in this
chapter shall be given to all persons to whom certificates of public convenience and necessity have
been theretofore issued.
Sec. 44-2-6. Application for additional authority by holders. Upon the filing of an application for a certificate any present holder of a
certificate may apply for additional authority
under such certificate for the same or any other
number of ambulances for which authority is
asked in the application and such request for
additional authority shall be heard in conjunction with the application initially filed.
Sec. 44-2-7. Determination of need and issuance of certificate. If the board of commis-
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sioners finds that additional ambulance service
in Salt Lake City is required by public convenience and necessity and that an applicant is fit
willing and able to perform such
and to conform to the provisions of this title and
the rules promulgated hereunder by the board of
commissioners, then the board of commissioners
shall issue a certificate stating the name and address of the applicant, the number of vehicles
authorized under said certificate, the color scheme
or insignia to be. used to designate said vehicles,
and the date of issuance; otherwise, the application shall be denied.
In making the above findings, the board of
commissioners shall take into consideration the
number of ambulances already in operation, whether existing ambulance transportation is adequate to meet the public need, the probable effect
of the issuance on existing carriers, the probable
effect of increased service on local traffic conditions, the character, experience and responsibility
of the applicant, the number and kind and type
of equipment, the color scheme and designation
to be used, and the ability of the applicant to
earn a fair return on the capital invested.
Sec. 44-2-8. Existing licenses allowed certifi·
cates. All persons operating ambulances under
permits or licenses issued by Salt Lake City as
of the effective date of this title shall have a
certificate of public convenience and necessity
awarded to them, allowing them to operate the
same number of vehicles as they are presently
authorized to operate, without the hearing pro·
vided in the preceding section and without a
finding of public convenience and necessity; pro·
vided that they file within sixty days after the
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effective date of this title the applications required herein and pay the fees required by this
title and qualify under its other terms.

SUM.MARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDINANCE, TITLE 44, CHAPTER
2, AND PARTICULARLY THE PORTION
THEREOF RELATING TO CERTIFICATES
OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, IS
VOID AND INVALID BECAUSE THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION HAD AND HAS NO AUTHORITY, EXPRESS NOR IMPLIED, TO
PASS SUCH AN ORDINANCE.
A. THE LEGISLATURE HAS NEVER
GRANTED CITIES THE RIGHT TO ISSUE FRANCHISES OR CERTIFICATES
OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
FOR PUBLIC MOTOR CARRIERS (AUTOlHOBILE CORPORATION).
B. TO PERMIT CITIES OR TOWNS
TO ISSUE CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY UNDER SECTION 54-6-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, 'VOULD RESULT IN COMPLETE
CONFUSION.
C. ARTICLE XI, SECT I 0 N 5 OF
9

THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH (THE
AMENDMENT), IS LIMITED TO CHAR.
TER CITIES AND IS NOT SEL1'-.-EXE.
CUTING.
D. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGE HANSON'S
MEMORANDUM DECISION ARE INAPPLICABLE.
POINT II
THE ORDINANCE, AND PARTICULAR
LY THE PROVISIONS THEREOF REQUIR
ING A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE
AND NECESSITY TO OPERATE AN Al\i!BU.
LANCE UPON THE STREETS OF SALT
LAKE CITY AND PERMITTING THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS TO GRANT A
FRANCHISE TO ONE CITIZEN AS AGAINST
ANOTHER ARE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS I AND 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THE 5TH AND
14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
POINT III
THE SAID ORDINANCE, AND PARTIC·
ULARLY THE PROVISIONS REQUIRING A
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
10

AND NECESSITY, IN ALL PRACTICAL EFFECT GRANTS AN UNLAWFUL MONOPOLISTIC FRANCHISE TO PLAINTIFF HEREIN AND DEPRIVES THE DEFENDANT
AND CROSS-CLAIMANT, GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., OF ITS PROPERTY AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN VIOLATION OF
THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.

POINT I
THE ORDINANCE, TITLE 44, CHAPTER
2, AND PARTICULARLY THE PORTION
THEREOF RELATING TO CERTIFICATES
OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY, IS
VOID AND INVALID BECAUSE THE BOARD
OF CO:M:MISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION HAD AND HAS NO AUTHORITY, EXPRESS NOR IMPLIED, TO
PASS SUCH AN ORDINANCE.
A. THE LEGISLATURE HAS NEVER
GRANTED CITIES THE RIGHT TO ISSUE FRANCHISES OR CERTIFICATES
OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY
FOR PUBLIC MOTOR CARRIERS (AUTOMOBILE CORPORATION).
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It is an unalterable rule of law in the State of Utah
(and almost uniformly) that municipal corporations
possess and can exercise only such powers as are granted
in express words, or those necessarily or fairly implied
in or incident to the powers expressly covered.

537:

As stated in Salt Lake City v. Revene, 124 P.2d
"A municipal corporation possesses and can
exercise the following powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
to the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation, - not
simply convenient, but indispensable." [Citing
Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., p. 448
and numerous Utah cases.} See also 37 Arn.
J ur., Municipal Corporations, § 112.

'Ve can search our statutes in vain and we shall not
find any provision whatsoever wherein the Legislature
has granted to cities or their governing bodies the power
to issue franchises or certificates of convenience and .
necessity as relates to the operation of ambulances, nor
to regulate nor prohibit the operation thereof without
first having obtained such certificates.
The statutes of the State of Utah give to the Pub·
lie Service Commission of Utah the right to regulate
and control all common motor carriers of property or
passengers, and the transportation for compensation on
the public highways. (Sections 54-6-2, 54-6-3 and 54·
6-4, Utah Code Ann. 1953).
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Section 54-6-12 provides for exceptions from the
provisions of the Act. Without admitting the validity
of said section, (which itself may be void for ambiguity),
we call attention to the fact that the exception, under
which any city would have to base its right to regulate
ambulances as not coming under the powers and jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, would be
sub-paragraph (f) thereof. That section provides that
except for other provisions of law relative to insurance
requirements, safety regulations and accident reports,
the Act relating to motor vehicle transportation and the
regulation thereof by the Public Service Commission,
shall not apply "to motor vehicles . . . when used as
hearses, ambulances, or licensed taxi cabs, operating
within a fifteen ( 15) mile radius of the limits of any
city or town." No where in the acts relating to the regulation of motor carriers for hire does it state that cities
shall have the right or power to regulate or issue certificates of convenience and necessity as to ambulances.
The fact that the Legislature has chosen to exempt
from the regulation by the Public Service Commission
ambulances when operating within a radius of fifteen
miles of the limits of any city or town, does not thereby
grant to such cities or towns the right to so regulate or
to issue certificates of convenience and necessity with
regard thereto. The only inference that can be drawn
is that there shall be no regulation (except as to insurance, safety and accident reports) as relates to such
matters, in the absence of specific regulatory authority
granted to the cities.
13

In the case of Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public
Service Commission, ll8 P.2d 683, it became pertinent
to determine whether or not a city had the right to issue
a franchise to a public motor carrier ("automobile corporation" as defined by Section 54-2-1 ( 12) ) to operate
upon the streets of the city, the matter being pertinent
because the statute under consideration required that an
application to the Public Service Commission for a cerificate of convenience and necessity would be required
to show that it had received the "consent, franchise, or
permit" of the city authorities wherein it would operate.
The court, after considering the statutes involved, as
they might apply to the case there at hand, stated:
"It is evident that the provisions of the sub·
section do not apply to certificates such as that
here involved but only to the classes specified in
the subdiYision itself. This is further evidenl
from the fact that a city or municipal corporation
has no power under our statutes to grant to or
require an automobile corporation (defined i11
sub-division 12, Section 76-2-1, R.S.U. 1933).
t.o have a local franchise to engage in business
Cities and incorporated towns have no general
qrant of power to require or grant franchises
'(Emphasis added.) They may grant franchise!
to railroads, street railways, tramways, and unior
railroad depot companies (Section 15-8-33),
waterworks companies, gas companies, electr11
light and telephone lines (Section
t.
telearaph and all wire lines and pole lmes (Sec
tionn 15-8-21); to gas, electric or lighting work
(Section 15-8-20). And there is a special proVI
sion as to railroads in Section 77-0-8. The Con
stitution, Article 12, Section 8, reserves to citie
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and incorporated towns the franchise power of
street railway, telegraph, telephone and electric
light companies. These sections cover all the
franchise powers of cities and towns as set forth
and granted by the statutes. That an automobile
corporation such as this is not a street railway
was held in Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden.
City et al., 89 Utah 546, 58 P. 2d 1. See also,
subdivisions 8 and 12 of Section 76-2-1, R.S.U.
1933, defining both terms. As to motor transport
companies (automobile corporations), the cities'
power is found in Section 15-8-39, R.S.U. 1933,
providing 'they may license, tax and regulate
***stages and busses, sight-seeing and touring
cars or vehicles, cabs and taxi-cabs, * * * hackmen, draymen, and drivers of stages, busses,
sightseeing and touring cars, cabs and taxicabs
and other public conveyances." (Italics added.)
There is no power granted to require or grant
a franchise for the use of the streets and highways for the purpose of traveling thereon as used
by the public generally. A
is the privilege of doing that which does not belong to the
citizens generally by a common right. 12 R.C.L.
p. 17 4. As to streets, it is the right to do something in the public highway which except for the
grant would be a trespass. People v. State Board
of Tax Com'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69, 63
L.R.A. 884, 105 Am. St. Rep. 674; 12 R.C.L.
p. 175. Thus the right to lay rail, or pipes, or
string wires or set poles along a public street !s
not an ordinary business in which everyone may
engage, or a use everyone may make of the street,
but is a special privilege, a franchise to be granted
for the accomplishment of public objects. They
are required only in cases in which it is sought
to impose upon the street a special burden which
cannot he imposed generally, that is, to burden
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the street with a special privilege which the public generally may not likewise enjoy. Business
such as that of the Airways does not so burden
the street. It uses the streets only for purposes
of travel and transport in the same manner as
the public generally. It is a business not subject
to franchise requirements."
It should be observed that the statute referred to
in the above-quoted opinion, namely, 15-8-39, R.S.U
1933, is one, the same, and identical to Section 10-8-39,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and has never been amended or changed since its enactment; nor has any other
statute been enacted by the Legislature granting fur.
ther or additional powers to cities to issue franchises or
regulate the drivers of "public conveyances" under which
category ambulances would fall, if in fact they come al
all under the provisions of said statute. It should be
observed that the only power whatsoever with regard to
such matters, assuming that ambulances are includea
therein, would be to license, tax, and regulate th!
"driver" of such conveyances.

B. TO
CITIES OR
TO ISSUE CERTIFICATES OF CONVEN·
IENCE AND NECESSITY UNDER SEC
TION 54-6-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, WOULD RESULT IN COMPLETE
CONFUSION.
To emphasize by demonstration the fact that thi
excep'tion provided in Section 54-6-12 did not contelll
plate the granting of authority to cities or towns ti
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1

1

1

1
1

issue certificates of convenience and necessity as to am-.
bulances, but rather contemplated that there be no requirement for licensing within the area covered by the
exception, we call attention to the confusion and possible
conflicting regulations which might result. The statute
exempts "motor vehicles when used as ... ambulances
... operating within a fifteen ( 15) mile radius of the
limits of any city or town." Under a literal interpretation, assuming it were intended to grant cities the power
to issue certificates and regulate ambulances within the
area defined, Salt Lake City could control such operations fifteen miles beyond its own city limits and extending into South Salt Lake, Murray, \Voods Cross, etc.
Likewise, there would be no reason why South Salt
Lake could not enact an ordinance permitting the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity to operate within a fifteen mile radius of its city limits, which
would include practically all of Salt Lake City. The
confusion which would result from the issuance of such
certificates by numerous cities and towns to areas extending over the radius permitted by the statute is so obvious
as to permit no conclusion but that the Legislature
simply intended by the exclusion that there be no regulation as to convenience and necessity within the area
excluded.
It should be pointed out that Salt Lake City's ordinance originally prohibited the operation for hire of
ambulances "upon the streets of Salt Lake City" without a certificate of convenience first having been issued
by the Board of Commissioners. Even before the filing
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of the suit and the issuance of the injunction in thii
matter, that ordinance was amended to exclude from the
provisions thereof "any ambulance service duly licensed
by proper authority anywhere in the State of C tah i11
bringing into Salt Lake City and discharging anywher(
within Salt Lake City persons taken on as passengeri
outside the limits of Salt Lake City." This was a recognition of the impracticability and in fact the unconstitu.
tional denial of the right of others to perfom their regu·
lar businesses, if the old ordinance were retained.
other words, ambulances properly operating
license from Salt Lake County with emergency passen·
gers would have had to stop at the city line. The city
therefore, tried to adopt their ordinance to a more work
able measure. This, however, does not alter the fact that
the authority does not or did not exist to prohibit tbt
operation within the city in any regard without the cer·
tificate, because the city has no authority to so regulate
The broad language of the injunctions as originall)
entered enjoined Gold Cross "from operating ambu
lances for hire upon the streets of Salt Lake City" with
out qualification. Inasmuch, however, as the amends
tory ordinance published June 21, 1968 was in force arn
effect when plaintiff's complaint was filed and when thi
injunctions were issued, they were improperly and un
lawfully issued and went beyond the scope of even th
invalid ordinance, and, hence, Gold Cross Services, Inc
should be permitted to show and recover its damage
by reason of the improper issuance of the injunctions.
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C. ARTICLE XI, SECT I 0 N 5 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH (THE
AMENDMENT), IS Ll1"1ITED TO CHARTER CITIES AND IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING.
In the Memorandum Decision of Judge Stewart
l\l. Hanson, he cites Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah as a basis for concluding that Salt
Lake City had the power to issue certificates of convenience and necessity ( R. 47) ; and Judge Faux concluded
that he was bound by the decision of Judge Hanson
(R. 101).
\Ve point out the fact that Salt Lake City is not
a charter city. The provisions of Article XI, Section 5,
which were added to the Constitution by amendment in
1932, relate to, and are limited to, charter cities which
become such under the terms of that constitutional
amendment. The portion thereof which, if any, would
relate to this question, would be sub-paragraph (b)
thereof. This Court has already held that such provisions are not applicable and cities other than charter
cities gain no powers whatsoever from that provision
of the Constitution.
In the case of Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83
Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161, 171, where there was involved
the question of the validity of certain revenue bonds and
it was endeavored to find authority for the issuance
thereof in this provision of the Constitution, this Court
stated:
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"The rule is well established that a city or
ganized and operating under general law mai
possess and exercise only the powers
express words and such as are necessarily or fair
ly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressli
granted, or those essential to the declared object:
and purposes of the corporation not merely con
venient but indispensable. Ogden City v. Bea
Lake & River \Vater- \V orks Irr. Co., 16 Uta!
440, 52 P. 697, 41 L.R.A. 305; Salt Lake
v. Sutter, supra; 1 .McQuillin Municipal Corpu;
(2d Ed.) §367, p. 910.

"It is urged that all cities of the state have arn
may exercise all the powers referred to in th
enumeration of powers iu the amendment to th
Constitution even beyond that which is grante1
by legislative act. \Ve think this contention cau
not be sustained. If it be true, as we think it h
that people of a city in forming a charter ma.
restrict its legislative body, or refuse or fail I
confer by charter all the powers which by tb
Constitution may be conferred, and if legislatir
cities have only the powers expressly conferre
and those necessarily implied, then the city mu:
look either to its charter where such charter!
one adopted by it, or to the legislative enactment
to determine the nature and extent of powers I
be exercised by its legislative body or other off
cers. This must be so, unless the constitutiorn
language is such as to be self-executing,
conferring powers directly on the leg1slatn
body of the city. The amendment is not such
grant of power."
This Court again had occasion to refer to and r1
iterate this holding in the case of Ut,ah Rapid Trans
Company v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1, whir
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case involved a writ of prohibition to prohibit Ogden
City from purchasing and operating motor busses as a
common carrier within the city. This Court in referring
to the powers of cities and the constitutional
above referred to, stated:
"Ogden City has not adopted a charter and
therefore must rely upon legislative grant to
avail itself of 'the power to be conferred upon'
it by the constitutional provision under review..
Such provision is not self-executing. If it were
so construed, there would be no purpose accomplished by a city adopting a charter unless, perhaps, by that means it could limit its powers. The
constitutional provision relied upon by defendants is not open to the construction contended
for by them. The power 'to furnish all local public services: etc., may be vested in the city by an
act of the Legislature or by the adoption of a
charter and not otherwise."
D. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
REFERRED TO IN JUDGE HANSON'S
MEMORANDUM DECISION ARE INAPPLICABLE.

Judge Hanson in his Memorandum Decision, and
which Judge Faux concluded was binding upon him, re1 ferred to certain sections of the Utah Code Annotated
which he thought were applicable and might give authority to the city to enact ordinances permitting it to
:i issue certificates of convenience and necessity and limit
s by franchise the operation of ambulances on the streets
c of Salt Lake City (R. 47). The first one he refers to
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is Section 10-9-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It ap
pears obvious that this reference must have been in
tended to refer to Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Anno
tated, 1953, because there is no Section 10-9-39 in ou
statutes. We have already disposed of the possibility 0
Section 10-8-39 granting these powers to the city b
reference to the decision of this Court in the case (
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Commu
sion, supra. Likewise we have disposed of the referern
therein to Article XI, Section 5.
With regard to the other sections, referred to b
Judge Hanson, it is likewise obvious that he is talkin
about Title 10, Chapter 8 of the Utah Code Annotatei
With regard then to Sections 10-8-11, 10-8-30, 10-8-81
10-8-61, and 10-8-84, a cursory examination of thO!
sections will convince anyone that they have no beariJJ
whatsoever upon this matter and do not in any manrn
authorize or empower the cities to issue certificates 1
convenience and necessity as relates to the operation
motor carriers on the city streets. They are revern
regulation measures and in no way would permit a cit
to prohibit one person from operating an ambulan1
while permitting another person to do so.
1

POINT II

THE ORDINANCE, AND PARTICULAI I
LY THE PROVISIONS THEREOF REQUII
ING A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENC

22

1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

AND NECESSITY TO OPERATE AN AMBULANCE UPON THE STREETS OF SALT
LAKE C I TY AND PERMITTING THE
BOARD OF CO.MMISSIONERS TO GRANT A
FRANCHISE TO ONE CITIZEN AS AGAINST
ANOTHER ARE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS I AND 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THE 5TH AND
14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

It is generally recognized that the right to work is
1 the right to engage in gainful occupations and the right
1 to enjoy the benefits resulting from the work of one so
employed and to engage in commerce or legitimate business of any kind, is a property right protected by Article
J I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
and likewise by the 5th and 14th Amendments of the
1 Constitution of the United States.
Furthermore, the
1 granting of a monopoly, which in effect improperly
1 gives to one person the right to engage in a business and
by the same process deprives another person of his right
to engage in that business, results in depriving such
latter person of property without due process of law
and denies him the equal protection of the laws in violation of said constitutional provisions. See McGrew v.
Industrial Commission, 96 U. 203, 85 P.2d 608. The
arguments set forth in the next subheading further sup] port the contention as to such unconstitutionality.
I
11

1f

11

11
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POINT III
THE SAID ORDINANCE, AND PARTIC
ULARLY THE PROVISIONS REQUIRING;
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCJ
AND NECESSITY, IN ALL PRACTICAL EI
FECT GRANTS AN UNLA,VFUL
LISTIC FRANCHISE TO PLAINTIFF HERE
IN AND DEPRIVES THE DEFENDAN'
AND
GOLD CROSS SE]
VICES, INC., OF ITS PROPERTY ANJ ·
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EQUAL PROTE(:
TION OF THE LA 'vs IN VIOLATION 01 1
THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITl 1
TIONS.
1
l

As pointed out in the Amended Answer and Cow
1
terclaim and Cross-Claim of Gold Cross Services, Im
the certificates of convenience and necessity granted t .
l
the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City Corpm
. 1
tion to the plaintiff, Intermountain Ambulance Serv1r
Inc., (through grants to predecessors in interest ar
thence through merger) were without hearings or ar <=
basis of determination of convenience and necessit ti
These allegations are uncontroverted. Then along can
the ordinance presently existing requiring the certifica I;
of convenience and necessity and the hearing and sho1 t
in gs with regard thereto, in order for any other pers'
to engage in an ambulance service in Salt Lake Cil
For all practical purposes, this locked the door to a1
additional ambulance service within the City of S:
Lake, if such ordinances were held to be valid.
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As indicated, the method of issuing the certificates
to the plaintiff above named, and the very nature of the
ambulance business, to-wit, that the users of such business are individuals who are generally one time users,
and surely seldom, if ever, frequent users of the service,
results in establishing a monopoly in favor of the plaintiff. The practical problems of getting witnesses for a
hearing, who would be users of the service, to establish
the public necessity, as distinguished from convenience,
are almost insurmountable as will be obvious to anyone
familiar with hearings involving certificates of public
convenience and necessity and the evidence necessary to
· establish public necessity. Likewise, because of the nature of the business and the fact that the persons who
use the service are usually one time users, it is a prac1 tical impossibility to learn the identity of prospective
: witnesses who might have had experience with the exist. ing licensed operators which would show that their ser, vices were either poor or inadequate.
f

t

Monopolies surely may not be established without
r express constitutional and statutory authority. They
tare frowned upon, and as stated in 36 Am. Jur., Monopn olies. Combinations, etc., Section 3, injury to the public
3 is implied from the use of monopolies. The footnote to
JI that section, which cites numerous cases, states: ·

r

j[

i:

":Monopoly is destructive of individual rights
and of that free competition which is the life of
business, and it revives and perpetuates one of
the great evils which it was the object of the
framers of our form of government to eradicate
25

and prevent. It is alike destructive to both
vidual enterprise and individual prosperity, wh
ther conferred on corporations or individua!
and therefore public policy, as well as pub!
sentiment, is, and ought to be, against it."
Our court in the case of Utah Light & Tractil
Company v. Public Service Commission of Utah, supr
has classified the certificate of convenience and necessi
of the type here involved as a franchise. In 36 Am. Jt
2d 722, Section 1, Franchises, it is stated:

"The view taken in a number of cases is tn
to be a franchise, the right possessed must
such as cannot be exercised without the expn
permission of the sovereign power - that is,
privilege or immunity of a public nature whi .
cannot be legally exercised without legislati ·
grant. It is a privilege conferred by governme 1
on an individual, or a corporation to do tn 4
'which does not belong to the citizens of the cou
try generally by common right.' "
In Section 12, Franchises, page 735, it is stated:

l

1

"In granting franchises, a municipal corpor 1
tion possesses and can exercise only powi c
granted by express words or those
1
implied in or incident to the Legislative gra1 1
and any ambiguity or doubt as to the existeu
of a power is to be resolved against the corpo!
tion, and the power
statutes. delegatt 1
authority to grant franchises are subject to ru
of strict construction."
Section 18, Franchises, states:

s
f

"A purported grant of a municipal franch 11
may be invalid because of a lack of power on I
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part of the municipality for such purpose, or because of noncompliance with mandatory require. as to proced?re. F.ranchises granted by
murnc1pal corporations without legislative authority, express or implied, in excess of their
charter powers, or in violation of the constitution
of the state, are void, at least to the extent of the
illegal excess, and even if they have been accepted and acted on by the grantees in good faith,
this creates no rights by estoppel or otherwise
which the constitution will protect."

CONCLUSION
.

VV e respectfully submit that on the
of the
foregoing arguments and the authorities cited, and par11 ticularly in view of the holding of this Court in the cases
tn of Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Comiu mission, supra, and Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, supra, and Utah Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City,
: supra, that Salt Lake City had and has no power or
OJ authority to issue franchises in the nature of certificates
w1 of public convenience and necessity which cover the operation of vehicles of the type into which ambulances fall,
·ai
d h ,.
en an t at:

101

u

a. The ordinance is and should be declared completely invalid and of no force and effect.

b. That the cross-defendant, Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City Corporation, be restrained
L from enforcing the proviisons of said ordinance as
Cll
•
n I agamst Gold Cross Services, Inc.
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c. The judgment of the lower Court should be 1
versed and the case remanded for a hearing to determiJ
the amount of damages which defendant-appellar
Gold Cross Services, Inc., has sustained by reason:
the improper issuance of the injunctions.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES,
WATKISS, CAMPBELLi
& CO,iVLEY
ZARE. HAYES
Attorneys for Defendantappellant
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